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Introduction 
The first-time reader of Pla to ' s Republic is often shocked at 
the rough treatment and eventual exclusion of art in P la to ' s ideal 
state. The Republic has been described as one of the greatest at-
tacks on democracy and freedom in the history of Western thought, 
and the restrictive treatment of art in Book III can seem unduly 
harsh to the modern reader. By the time that the interlocutors reach 
Book X it seems that all non-craft art has been entirely banished 
from the polis due to its corrupting impurity. T o the modern reader, 
the extreme nature of this proclamation is highlighted by our his-
torical knowledge . Even the more brutal and repressive totalitar-
ian states of the last century—for example , those of Hit ler ' s Third 
Reich and the Soviet Union under Josef Stal in—did not go so far 
as to completely outlaw art. 1 There is a second surprise for the 
first-time reader of the Republic in Book X insofar as this final 
book seems to contradict, disregard, or forget the conclusion that 
the interlocutors reached concerning art in Book III. This appar-
ent contradiction calls for a close reading and interpretation of the 
text in light of both Pla to ' s conception of mimesis and the overall 
project of the Republic. 
The problem lies in the apparent incommensurabil i ty of the 
discussions on the suitability of art, specifically poetry, for the 
polis as put forth in Book X and Book III. Book III seems to al low 
that some forms of poetry and imitation will be acceptable in the 
state while others will be rejected. The discussion of poetry in this 
section concludes that "we ourselves,/*?/' our souls' good, should 
continue to employ the more austere and less delightful poet and 
taleteller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would 
tell his tale in the patterns we prescribed in the b e g i n n i n g . . . [ital-
ics mine I" (398b) . 2 However , in Book X it appears that all imita-
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tive poetry has been excluded from the state, a l lowing for no dis-
tinction similar to the one with which Book III concludes . The 
opening lines of Book X expose this apparent leap in logic in the 
classification of poetry by "refusing to admit at all so much of it as 
is imitative, for that is certainly not to be received" (595a) . Book 
III seems to recognize that imitative poetry is very powerful and 
can be either harmful or beneficial, and must therefore be regu-
lated. Book X appears to take these concerns much further by 
excluding all imitative poetry, for various reasons, without regard 
to any of the possible benefits that might be gained from it. H o w 
can we reconcile these two treatments of mimeses! Has Plato for-
gotten or contradicted his position in Book III in Book X ? Obvi -
ously, he has not. The theory of art in the Republic may be complex 
and may be distasteful, but it remains consistent. Al though we 
will be able to reconcile the treatments of art and mimeses in Books 
III and X, we will find that such reconciliation raises new prob-
lems for the polis. Chief among these new difficulties is finding a 
citizen of P la to ' s city-state who is both able and willing to pursue 
imitative art in the restricted manner in which it is to be al lowed in 
the Republic. 
Book HI 
Art is first discussed in relation to the education of the guard-
ian class. The education of the guardians will begin with gymnas -
tics and music. Music , under which Plato includes tales and poetry, 
is one of the first types of education to which the young guardians-
to-be are exposed. Plato distinguishes two types of tales that will 
be used in the process of education, one true and the other false. 
Education eventually uses both true and false tales, but it begins 
with false tales told to children. " W e must begin, then, it seems, 
by a censorship over our story makers , and what they d o well we 
must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list 
we will induce nurses and mothers to tell the children and so shape 
their souls . . ." (377c). However , most commonly told stories 
must be rejected either for their subject matter or the manner in 
which the tale is told. It should be noted that Plato is not at all 
adverse to lying to the citizens in the course of educa t ion—nor in 
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the course of governing the c i ty—however , there are some lies 
that he will not sanction. Given Pla to ' s resolve to reach the truth, 
the reader should be suspicious—if not downright indignant—that 
he sets forth a policy of educational lies so cavalierly. Indeed, this 
is not the only passage in which Plato places an important govern-
mental function on a foundation of lies told to the c i t i zens . 3 Thus , 
in Book III, it is obvious that Plato 's aversion is not to lying itself, 
but to the content of the lie and how the content may effect the 
young guardians. 
In Book III, Plato undertakes a lengthy inquiry into mimesis in 
order to determine how art of this type (imitative) will affect the 
education of the guardians, and thus the polis. He inquires into the 
nature and results of art because he is well aware of the manner in 
which art influences the noble and common people al ike, shaping 
their views. Plato enters this broad discussion of art by examining 
poetry. Poetry, including the forms of poetry that we might refer 
to as theater, was the major form of artistic expression for the 
Greeks, used for both entertainment and education. 
According to Plato, poetry exists in three main forms. Poetry 
can either "proceed by pure narration or by narrative that is ef-
fected through imitation, or by both" (392de). A modern example 
of pure narration exists in the capable news journalist . A good 
journalist simply reports the information in a clear and easily un-
derstandable manner: a manner that remains disinterested in the 
sense of remaining impartial concerning the facts being reported. 
The reporter should not embellish the story by changing his voice , 
body language, or delivery to imitate the people about whom he is 
reporting. Purely imitative poetry exists in a modern format in 
every form of acting. In movies , television and on stage the high-
est goal is imitation so perfect and seamless that "it seems real ." 
Actors are praised and paid for their ability to " b e c o m e " a variety 
of characters. Finally, an example of what Plato might call a mixed 
format exists in a National Geographic documentary, wherein some 
of the footage is taken straight from things as they happen, while 
other scenes are recreated in a manner similar to a fictional movie . 
In such a format, much of the footage is shot in a narrative or 
documentary style, but scenes that would be difficult or dangerous 
to reproduce as they actually occur are staged and filmed to give 
the illusion that they were filmed as the events took place. 
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Given his threefold distinction in poetry, Plato undertakes to 
determine which forms will be acceptable in the perfect polis. 
Before he can pass judgment on the different forms of poetry, he 
must determine what is essential to each; and this entails divining 
the nature of mimesis. Furthermore, it will be imperative to ask: 
" D o we wish our guardians to be good mimics or no t ? " (394e) . 
Finally, do we wish to allow imitative poets to ply their trade in 
the polis for any of the citizens? That is, do we wish any of the 
citizens of the Republic to view imitation? Pure narration is ex-
plained simply enough at 393d-394b with an example of a Homeric 
passage delivered as a report, in a monotone devoid of changing 
cadence or imitation of characters. Plato takes this form of poetry 
to be a simple and accurate reporting of the facts. Imitation, de -
spite being present in its pure state in the Greek theatrical forms of 
tragedy and comedy, takes more explanation in order to ascertain 
its nature. 
One of the factors that will weigh heavily on the fate of imita-
tion in the city-state is Plato 's insistence on a society ordered by 
the maxim "one man, one vocation." Plato believes that insis-
tence on this model of one and only one j o b is a form of just ice. 
"The proper functioning of the money-makers , the helpers , and 
the guardians, each doing his own work in the state . . . would be 
justice and would render the city jus t" (434d). As we will see, this 
universal rule will cause problems even for the forms of art that 
are to be allowed in the polis. For each person to realize his poten-
tial, Plato believes that he should exert himself in the vocation to 
which he is best suited. To achieve as much as possible, one should 
not divide one ' s resources. Even if one ' s best talent was imitation 
it seems to follow that no one would be able to imitate several 
things as well as one, given that people are unable to do several 
things as well as they can do one. Therefore, the purely imitative 
poet and the epic poet are already censured on the basis that, even 
if imitation is to be allowed in the city, each imitator will only be 
allowed to imitate that which he imitates best. Fur thermore, the 
imitation of even one thing is also found to be harmful. Should a 
person choose to actually pursue his work in society—given that a 
person is to focus his efforts on one thing in l ife—or to imitate 
things in art, which contributes nothing tangible to the c o m m u -
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nity? This question verges on the rhetorical for Plato. Because 
each person is to have one vocation or duty within the society, 
there is no room for imitators, who contribute nothing as mere 
imitators, and who waste the energy properly reserved for o n e ' s 
work if imitation is a second vocation. 
Viewed as an educational tool however , imitation can be seen 
as good in some cases and bad in others. Indeed, for a variety of 
reasons, Plato is concerned with imitation primarily, if not solely, 
with regard to its value as a tool for education. Imitation is good 
insofar as it trains a person to develop the personality and charac-
teristics suited to his station in life. It does this by providing an 
example for emulat ion, a model on which to base o n e ' s own be-
havior. For example , if the guardians are to imitate, " they should 
from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to t h e m — m e n , that 
is, who are brave, sober, pious, free, and all things of that k ind" 
(395c) . Imitation in such cases would be imitation of the fully 
developed persons that the young guardians are to become. 
Imitation can, obviously, be just as detrimental to growth and 
development . Insofar as a person imitates another person, he at-
tempts to mimic that person in speech, action, and demeanor . Such 
mimicry is likely to develop the imitated characteristics simply by 
repetition and habituation. The potential for imitation to subtly 
effect and eventually alter the character of the imitator—and the 
character of the frequent observer of imitation—is at the very heart 
of P la to ' s objection to mimesis. The power of mimet ic art is thus 
worthy of both respect and fear. If imitation is of the proper sort, 
it can be used to provide a proper model that the citizens can look 
to in order to imitate. Indeed, if P la to ' s ideas about the power of 
art to influence the viewer are correct, the good example given by 
good imitative art will positively effect the viewers even without 
their conscious emulation of the themes in the art. If, however , the 
mimetic art provides an improper model , the result will be the 
exact opposite of the positive mimetic example . It is easy to imag-
ine that a normally well-spoken person might, after playing a foul-
mouthed cab driver for months in a play, find himself cursing in 
everyday speech. This type of imitation—of any people who are 
not themselves guardians of the highest ability and wisdom—could 
easily be disastrous for the developing mind of a young would-be 
guardian. 
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Given this discussion of imitation and the potential benefits 
and possible evils associated with it, Plato must determine to what 
extent, if any, imitative arts will be allowed to flourish in the polis. 
Plato identifies and defines two types of imitation and three types 
of poetry in Book III of the Republic. Imitation itself is either 
good, if it provides a good example for the viewer, or bad, if its 
example is neutral or detrimental to the viewer. The three types of 
poetry are distinguished by the extent they utilize imitation: 1) 
narration, which will involve as little imitation as possible; 2) pure 
imitative poetry as seen in tragedy; and, 3) a mix of these two , as 
seen in epic poetry. It is important to keep in mind that even nar-
rative-style poetry will contain some imitation. "The narrative 
that [the good man] will employ will be of the kind that we just 
now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one 
that partakes of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there 
will be a small portion of imitation in a long d i scourse" (396e) . 
Because imitation is inherently dangerous—insofar as it submerges 
o n e ' s own personali ty for the personal i ty imi ta ted—imi ta t ion 
should be used as little as possible. Therefore the style of " p u r e " 
narration should be the style of the perfect state. Al though this 
narrative style imitates, it does so as little as possible. It goes 
without saying that the small amount of imitation that will exist in 
the poetry that is allowed will be imitation of good men who em-
body the Platonic ideal. " A man of the right sort, I think, when he 
comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good 
man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and 
will feel no shame in that kind of mimicry" (396d) . The poet will 
"by preference [imitate] the good man when he acts steadfastly 
and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by 
sickness or love or drunkenness or any other m i shap" (396d) . By 
the end of the treatment in Book III, Plato seems to be satisfied 
with the limits and restrictions imposed on poetry and its use in the 
educational process. The interlocutors have greatly restricted art, 
censuring all of it that does not provide examples of thoughts , ac-
tions, or emotions that would be proper for people who are gov-
erned by their rational part, people who have perceived the Good. 
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T h e Seeming C o n t r a d i c t i o n 
Given these conclusions, it comes as a surprise that, in the 
opening lines of Book X, Plato refers to the earlier t reatment of 
imitation and poetry "in refusing to admit at all so much of it as is 
imitat ive" (595ab). What can Plato possibly mean by stating that 
the conclusion of the earlier discussion was that all poetry that 
imitates would be banished from the polis! It seemed clear that 
the discussion of art and imitation in Book III ends , not with the 
exiling of all art, but with the strict censuring of art to insure that 
the art in the polis will be art that contributes to the just ice and 
harmony of the state, rather than art that detracts from it. The 
distinctions between the three types of poetry Plato recognizes can 
be helpful here. W e see right away that the purely imitative style 
and the so-called mixed style of poetry are dangerous in P la to ' s 
view. The purely imitative type of poetry "will attempt, seriously 
and in the presence of many, to imitate all things, including . . . 
claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and 
pulleys, the notes of trumpets . . . and the cries of dogs , sheep, and 
bi rds" (397b). The mixed imitative type of poetry is unacceptable 
for the same imitative excesses and on the principle that " there is 
no twofold or manifold man among us, since every man does one 
th ing" (397e) . Indeed, these two styles of poetry were effectively 
banned in Book III. 
However , Book III allows the narrative style of poet ry—which 
is somet imes referred to confusingly as if it were "non-imitat ive 
poet ry"—to exist in the polis: and this kind of poetry does imitate 
to some extent. Narrative style poetry imitates to the extent that 
the good man would deign to imitate. 4 At the beginning of Book 
X, Plato is referring to the exclusion of all imitative style poetry 
(i.e. the poetry of pure imitation and the mixed-style poetry) not to 
the exclusion of imitation itself. 5 Narrative-style poetry, which 
uses imitation as little as possible and only so far as it is good, is 
still al lowed in the state. Given this clarification of the difference 
between banning imitative-style poetry and banning imitation it-
self, Book X should be read as an addition to, or expansion of, the 
discussion in Book III. In Book X Plato re-opens the discussion of 
imitation in order to determine the extent that imitation itself can 
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be al lowed in poetry of the narrative s tyle—and, by extension, in 
all the other arts of the polis—and to introduce his final philo-
sophical discussion concerning justice and injustice in the man 
and in the state. 
BookX 
For Plato, imitation is inherently degenerate because it is so 
far removed from the truth. What is imitation? It is a copy, an 
image, of something. Furthermore, it is strictly speaking not even 
the copy of some-thing, but a copy of an appearance (one of many 
appearances) of something. The object that art imitates is itself 
merely an image of reality. Using, as Plato does , the example of 
painting, we can first see that a painting of a couch is not a couch. 
W e can not relax on the couch of the painting. The paint ing of the 
couch is a copy of the couch, but it is less a couch, it has less 
"couchness" then an actual couch. However , the paint ing of the 
couch is even less than an image of a couch, because it is really 
only an image of the couch from one perspective. It is an image of 
only one appearance of the couch. Like Pla to ' s example of the 
"creator" who "creates" any and all things by carrying around a 
mirror and capturing images of things he encounters , the painting 
captures only one appearance of one couch. There are both many 
other possible appearances of the couch in the mirror, or the paint-
ing, and many other actual couches which are not captured or rep-
resented in the mirror or painting. Given this understanding, we 
can see how little the imitation of the couch in painting helps in 
the understanding of the particular couch, let alone couch-in-it-
self, or the eiclos of couchness. Imitation captures " the appearance 
of [things], but not the reality and the truth" (596e) . 
However , the inadequacy of imitation goes even deeper in light 
of (or, perhaps, in distance from the light of) P la to ' s celebrated 
Theory of Forms . 6 The particular couch, which is the object of 
imitation in either the mirror or the painting, is itself merely an 
image or reflection of the Form of couch. Plato theorizes that 
every perceptible object is merely an image of a Form. The par-
ticular is both less real and, more importantly for the discussion of 
imitation, less true than the universal. Given Pla to ' s metaphysical 
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framework, an imitation of a particular couch in a painting is very 
far from the truth indeed. The painting of a couch is an image of 
an appearance of the Form. The imitation is at least three t imes 
removed from the truth. 
If all imitation is at least three steps back from the truth, what 
is to distinguish good or acceptable imitation from bad imitation? 
The answer lies in the relation of the "third s tep" away from the 
truth. The mirror is an excellent example of bad imitation. The 
mirror makes its copy of the couch by copying an appearance of 
the couch, not by copying the couch itself. It copies the appear-
ance of the image (the couch) of the truth (the form of couch) . In 
other words, the painter imitates with his eye on the physical mani -
festation of the couch in front of him, not with an ' e y e ' to the form 
of which the physical couch itself is merely a reflection. The bad 
imitation has this specific relation to that which it imitates: it imi-
tates the appearance of its object; that is, it imitates without an 
understanding of the form of the thing that it imitates. It is now 
clear that the type of imitation outlawed in Book III is the imita-
tion that has no knowledge of reality (the forms). The c o m m o n — 
that is "bad"—imi ta tor has "no knowledge he does not see, and 
therefore cannot represent, the ideal forms." 7 
In contrast, imitation which would be less objectionable would 
be a painter who , while painting the couch, has not the particular 
couch in front of him in mind, but the eidos of couch of which this 
particular couch is an example. Such an artist might not even have 
a physical couch present while painting, creating his image from 
the form itself. Just like the expert craftsman who makes a good 
couch, he creates with the form in mind, rather than a mere ap-
pearance. In his article "Imitation in Plato 's Republic" Tate claims 
that Plato " leaves it to be understood that the poet who is imitative 
in the sense in which the guardians are permitted to be imitative 
will produce a direct copy of reality [italics m i n e ] . " 8 This inter-
pretation would put some forms of artistic imitation one the same 
level as expert craftsmanship or practice. Both the expert crafts-
man and the good artistic imitator would create their product while 
apprehending the form of that which they are creating or imitat-
ing. Indeed, under this interpretation, good imitation is actual cre-
ation in the same sense as expert c raf tsmanship , for both are 
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imitating the form. This "mimesis of the form"—as opposed to 
ordinary mimesis of the image of the form—that Tate wants to 
ascribe to good imitation would eliminate virtually all the contro-
versy surrounding the apparent banning of imitation in Book X of 
the Republic. However , it is unclear that Plato would agree that 
the kind of imitation embodied in poetry would be capable of cre-
ating something as real as the act that the art is depict ing. For 
example , are we ready to claim that a poetic description of cour-
age that incorporates this "good mimesis" is as courageous as an 
act of courage? Due to his philosophical foundation, it is not likely 
that Plato would have agreed completely with this characteriza-
tion of good imitation, if only because of his insistence on a per-
son being expert at only one skill . 9 
However , even if we are to disagree with Tate concerning the 
art ist 's ability to successfully produce a direct copy of reality (the 
form) in his art, there remains a valid distinction between good 
and bad imitation. While good imitation is three steps back from 
the truth, it has the truth in mind to some extent. Bad imitation is 
three steps back and one to the side, so to speak, in the sense that 
one of the steps back copies an appearance of the previous step 
rather than the previous step itself. Good imitation in a painting of 
a couch will at least attempt to manifest the form of the couch, to 
copy the essential features of the couch. Bad imitation will be 
content to copy the physically perceived image of the couch. There-
fore, to be a good imitator, one must apprehend the form of the 
thing that is being imitated, rather than imitate from the physically 
observable characteristics of the thing one is imitating. 
Thus , there are two distinct prescriptions with which the law-
givers of the Republic must concern themselves. P la to ' s state will 
have to regulate the amount of imitation in poetry by al lowing 
only narrative style of poetry and, further, regulate the type of imi-
tation in the permitted style of poetry to insure that it is good imi-
tation. Therefore the narrative style of poetry, which may contain 
some imitation, will contain only imitation which has in mind the 
forms rather than the particulars while it is imitating. 
T H E OVERQUALIFIED ARTIST 
New Difficulties 
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Although this interpretation clears up some c o m m o n difficul-
ties resulting from a less than clear and consistent use of the term 
" imita t ion" in Pla to ' s treatment of art and poetry, it also fails to 
hurdle some significant obstacles and raises some interesting new 
quest ions. The first thing that we will have to assess, now that we 
have adopted this reading of Plato 's posit ion, is what the accept-
able Platonic artist will look like. Given the extensive restrictions 
placed on the practice of art in the polis, who will be both able and 
willing to undertake artistic endeavors? Secondari ly, given these 
same restrictions, what will the art of Plato 's polis look like? In-
terestingly, the answers to both of these questions present paral-
lels to modern aesthetic theory, in particular to the art and artists 
depicted in the later stages of the Hegelian-like development of art 
described by Arthur Danto in his essay "The End of Ar t . " 1 0 
At the very outset of such a comparison, we must note that we 
will not be able to represent either author in his totality if a com-
parison is to be fruitful. Although Danto ' s position in history en-
ables him to take account of Plato 's thought, Plato does not share 
this ability with regard to Danto. Given a certain incommensura-
bility between the two authors, we will have to bracket some of 
Dan to ' s project in order to fruitfully compare the art and artists of 
Dan to ' s second and third models with the art form that Plato ulti-
mately allows in the Republic. For example, we will be forced to 
bracket some of the strong Hegelian teleology of Dan to ' s model . 
At first glance, it may seem that Plato and Danto have little 
more in common than their concern with a Utopia of sorts, one 
Hellenic and the other Hegelian. Nevertheless, in spite the enor-
mous differences between Plato and Danto in terms of the type of 
philosophizing they are doing, they goal they have in mind for 
their projects, etc., there are similarities that warrant examinat ion. 
In particular, they are both deeply concerned with the relationship 
between phi losophy and art. The similarity of these concerns is 
evident in the following passage from Danto ' s essay "The End of 
Art ," in which he acknowledges his debt to the thought of Hegel . 
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'It is no doubt the case , ' Hegel writes in his Phi-
losophy of Fine Arts, ' that art can be utilized as a 
mere pastime and e n t e r t a i n m e n t . . . ' Art is truly 
free, he goes on to say, only when 'it has estab-
lished itself in a sphere it shares with religion and 
philosophy, becoming thereby one mode more and 
from through which . . . the spiritual truths of the 
widest range are brought h o m e to c o n s c i o u s -
n e s s . ' " 
This passage from Danto reads as an explicit Platonic treatise on 
good imitation might read—if we set aside the radical difference 
between what "spiritual truth" might have meant for Plato as op-
posed to Danto or Hegel. Before proceeding, we will first get a 
picture of just who will be capable of practicing art in P la to ' s polis 
and, once we have done so, we will then be able to compare this 
Platonic artist with some of Danto ' s characterizations of artists. 
Plato means to allow one type of poetry into the s ta te—the so-
called narrative style. Further, Plato insists that, insofar as it is 
imitative, the imitation of the narrative style will be restricted to 
the acceptable form of good imitation, imitation with the form or 
truth of the thing imitated in mind. Plato uses poetry as an arche-
typal example and intends to restrict other forms of art in a similar 
manner. However , given the structure of P la to ' s state, how will 
such art be undertaken? The unity of the polis and P la to ' s under-
standing of justice are built on the principle of one man, one work. 
Therefore if a person is an artist, art must be his sole vocation. 
However , the only art permitted in the state is art that imitates with 
the form foremost in mind. If a person can fix his eye on the form 
of a thing, why would he choose to labor at a third generat ion 
imitation (art), when he is able to construct a second generation 
image of truth by constructing the very thing he might have imi-
tated? Even if we accept the possibility of a good imitation al-
lowed in the polis, who would choose to produce impract ical 
imitations of the forms (good mimetic art) rather than practical 
images of the forms (crafts)? "If fa person! had genuine knowl-
edge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to 
real things than to the imitation of t hem" (599b). W h o would suf-
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fer to be a mere imitator in the state, rather than an actual crafts-
man? It cannot be one who masters the art of imitation, for his eye 
would not be on the form of that which he imitates, and his brand 
of art would be excluded from the state. This it seems that there is 
an artistic style and content which will be admitted in the state, yet 
remain unpracticed because any person worthy enough to practice 
the art is, by definition, overqualified to do so. 
There is an excellent solution ready at hand for this problem if 
we search the population of Pla to ' s state. In order for the state to 
take advantage of the power of art to educate (or indoctrinate) the 
cit izens, we need to find a type of person who is able to apprehend 
the form to be imitated and who will also condescend to merely 
imitate truth via art rather than create actual instances or embodi -
ments of the form. Where can we find a person with the mental 
ability to apprehend the forms, without the desire or ability to la-
bor and create the actual things they would imitate? Fortunately 
for Plato, his polls will have a ready-made supply of people who 
fit this description. The people who will educate through poe t ry— 
and other forms of ar t—via imitation will be the members of the 
ruling population who have the mental capacities to imitate prop-
erly, but are hampered by physical limitations: the old and the in-
jured members of the guardian class. 
Whi le this suggestion seems quite ridiculous at first, it makes 
good sense for the city. What is the state to do with the guardian 
who is maimed in defense of the civilization or the ancient states-
man who is replaced by younger guardians who are stronger of 
body and keener of mind? If we allow the infirm to educate through 
acceptable forms of artistic imitation, they will not become a mere 
burden on society. Indeed, Plato himself calls the man who no 
longer contributes to society while living on in the polis as a de -
pendent an example of "the greatest of all (of the] evi l s" resulting 
from the breakdown of justice (552). Without the outlet of work-
ing as educators, the only logical choice for the elderly or injured 
would be an extension of the eugenic practice of the polis to in-
clude "involuntary euthanasia" of the elderly or injured. If al-
lowed to work as educators such people will be able to give the 
other cit izens the benefits of their keen perception of the form, or 
forms, which they apprehend. Only among the ranks of the physi-
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cally infirm citizens will we find people who are both able and 
willing to pursue artistic imitation under the restrictions imposed 
by the state. Thus is because a keen mind often outlasts the body 
in which it res ides . 1 2 The bodies of the guardians will deteriorate 
while their minds are still capable of contributing to the state. 
There is precedence for this policy of education by the elders. 
W e can see this in the relegation of certain guardians and assis-
tants to watch over the child-guardians when they go to war as 
observers. Certainly, the vocation of these men and women calls 
them to the battle. They are more suited for active participation in 
the battle than for the role of observer. Nevertheless , these people 
are ordered to, and consent to, a rearguard role for the betterment 
of the next generation of guardians. W e must read this in one of 
two ways , either of which will make our point and al low some 
guardians to practice poetry in the city for the educat ion of the 
citizens. Either the rearguard soldiers at the "instructional war" 
are older soldiers who can no longer excel in the physical rigors of 
combat , but have knowledge of the martial forms and may thus 
instruct the guardians-to-be as to what is happening on the batt le-
field before them. Or, the rearguard is made up of soldiers who 
are able-bodied enough to fight at the front, but who are ordered to 
protect the children because it is in the best interests of the city as 
a whole to train the next generation of guardians. Because the city 
is concerned with the happiness of the whole rather than the happi-
ness of the individual, the soldiers so ordered would consent to not 
practice their practical skill (the craft of war) in favor of accepting 
a lesser j o b (interpretation and story telling for the education of 
the children) for the good of the city. Like the phi losopher who 
descends back into the cave to rule, they accept this burden as the 
price of their role in the perfect polis. 
Admittedly this analysis does not solve all the obscuri t ies and 
inconsistencies that arise regarding artistic endeavors within Plato 's 
state. Would the rulers allow the position of educator, an honored 
and critically important role within the state, to be filled by the 
infirm? Because the limitations in question are the results of ser-
vice to the state, there is good reason to believe that the people 
who have been injured at war or grown old as rulers would still 
have the respect and admiration of the cit izens. Outside the ranks 
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of the citizens who have been stricken with injuries or age, the 
only solution to the question of who could practice art is analo-
gous to the solution for creating the rulers themselves: either the 
artists must become philosophers, or the philosophers must be-
come artists. 
Given the unique constitution and training required to become 
a guardian, it is not practical to insist that the artists become phi-
losophers. However , if we allow education to take place through 
good mimetic art practiced by older or infirm people w h o are able 
to apprehend the forms, we are, in fact, choosing the second op-
tion and al lowing some philosophers to become artists. The cur-
rent generat ion of guardian-rulers cannot split their resources 
between two vocations (ruling and education). Therefore, it is 
only among the ranks of the "ret i red" philosophers that we will 
find people who can educate through art. The only qualifying state-
ment is that these philosophers, like the musical , poetic Socrates 
of the Phaedo, will pursue art only at the very end of their lives; 
and they will do so as a final service to the state. It seems both 
efficient and sensible to allow the types of people identified above 
to pursue art and education through art, under the final censorship 
and review of the current generation of rulers. 
Interestingly, the idea that the only legitimate artists will be 
people who are also philosophers has parallels with aspects of the 
Hegelian picture of modern art drawn by Danto. Legit imate art in 
the Republic might be cal led—and indeed is called by Ta te—"t rue , 
or philosophical, imitation." Such "imitat ion" would be direct imi-
tation of the forms themselves and, therefore, would be capable of 
producing a direct copy of reality (the form) rather than one medi -
ated by an image of the form (an object) . 1 3 This art of true or 
direct imitation would only be possible for phi losophers , for only 
philosophers are capable of apprehending the forms. Given that 
this art is a direct copy of the form, we are presented with the 
question of what this art would look like. Such art, practiced by 
philosophers, could not consist merely of images in the sense in 
which we normally think of them. W e can ask again, what would 
be the image of the form of courage (other than the courageous 
act)? W e are led to the conclusion that acceptable Platonic " a r t " — 
in particular, that art concerned with things that cannot be per-
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ceived with the senses—would look a great deal like phi losophy! 
Insofar as the art of the Republic comes to resemble phi losophy, it 
comes to resemble Danto 's characterization of modern ait as theory-
laden to the point of becoming philosophical. 
Arthur Danto ' s controversial article "The End of Ar t" presents 
three stages in the history of art, and three theories and styles that 
correspond to the stages. Art progresses from the mimet ic stage to 
the expressive stage and finally to what might be termed "post-
historic art ." W e are concerned with the art and artist of the latter 
two stages, and with the similarities that they may bear to the Pla-
tonic philosopher-artist we have described. It is with the second 
and third stages that Danto tells us art becomes less and less mi-
metic and more and more theoretical. "Objects became less and 
less recognizable and finally disappeared altogether in Abstract 
E x p r e s s i o n i s m . " N Nothing, it would seem, would please Plato 
more that to see art become less concerned with overt physical 
mimesis and more concerned with theory (philosophy). It is be-
cause art is indifferent to the forms that imitation in art remains 
three steps removed from truth. Art that creates while observing 
the forms would be art that is truly creative. Danto descr ibes this 
expressive type of art as giving the viewer insight into the mind of 
the artist. This , too, would appeal to Plato if the artists were in-
deed philosophers. 
Would insight into the mind of a philosopher who has suc-
cessfully apprehended the forms be fruitful for a commoner , a non-
guard ian—who has not apprehended the forms, and may actually 
be unable to do so? On one hand, it could be that such insight 
would be beneficial to the commoner due to the subtle influence 
of the example provided by the philosopher. Indeed, given P la to ' s 
model , a good example would influence the viewer for the better, 
just as an example of bad imitation would result in a negative in-
fluence. However , there is also the possibility of the commoner 
misinterpreting the example provided by the philosopher-artist. The 
commoner , recall, was unable to "make the g rade" during the ini-
tial chi ldhood testing process for guardians. If one is unable to 
perceive the forms themselves, what would enable him to correctly 
interpret copies of these forms—even Ta te ' s "direct copies of re-
al i ty"—with any greater success? It seems now that we must fur-
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ther restrict the domain of art in the Republic . Not only will phi -
losophers be the only artists; they will be the only ones a l lowed to 
view art. 
However , perhaps this problem can also be overcome. Plato 
is concerned with art primarily for its power as an educat ional 
tool, power that can have either good or bad results. Conceived 
thus, art could be the very instrument—indeed, the only instru-
ment—through which commoners would be able to get a fleeting 
and partial gl impse of the forms. And some acquaintance with the 
forms (as long as it is the result of true knowledge of the form) is 
better than none. A good poetic work of art by a person who un-
derstands the form of courage will provide a concrete example for 
someone who is not able to apprehend the form of courage on their 
own, just as the courageous act will provide a concrete example of 
the form of courage. 
Conclusion 
Plato and Danto both maintain, in their respective ways , that 
mimesis is inadequate to account for art. For Danto, mimet ic art is 
made insignificant by the advent of mimetic technology, leading 
in turn to expressive and philosophic art. For Plato, bad mimet ic 
art has always been deceptive and untrue insofar as it is at best a 
third generation copy of the form. While art must approach phi-
losophy to be worthwhile for Plato, art is destined to do so from 
Dan to ' s perspective. Ultimately, Danto tells us, in art "objects 
approach zero as their theory approaches infinity, so that virtually 
all there is at the end is theory, art having finally become vapor-
ized in a dazzle of pure t h o u g h t . . This seems, after a fashion, 
to be a good approximation of what would occur in the theorized 
good imitation of Pla to ' s Republic.™ The essence of good imita-
tion is that it imitates the form itself, presenting an image of the 
form for those who are unable to grasp the form itself due to youth 
(potential guardian children) or constitution (all citizens who are 
not "golden") . This image would not necessarily resemble the 
form, but would somehow manifest the form. In other words , the 
painting that imitates the form of humanity might, in fact, appear 
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quite abstract and look nothing like an actual physical pe r son— 
though both the physical person and the " g o o d " mimetic painting 
are reflections once removed from the form. 
Given these observations and speculations, the t ime has c o m e 
to answer the question that this essay has repeatedly deferred: What 
would the good imitative art of the polis look like? The difficulty 
of providing concrete examples of good art has plagued several 
prominent aesthetic thinkers, for example , Kant. Given the re-
strictions placed on art—with which we are now very famil iar— 
the poetry of the Republic would have to be someth ing like a 
somewhat tedious and heavy-handed moral story. Poetry would 
consist of primarily narration, interspersed with imitation of good 
men and women. The narration would consist of the explanation 
of all events and the actions of imperfect people. In addition, the 
narration would include—if the poetry were to be as effective as 
possible—philosophical explanations and arguments tailored to the 
level of sophistication of the audience. The effect of imitating of 
good people would only be heightened because this imitation would 
be the only part of the poem that would be enjoyable in the tradi-
tional sense—because of the elements that we commonly associ-
ate with theater. This form of poetry would be highly effective for 
Pla to ' s purposes. The poetry would educate overtly in the form of 
philosophical explanations in the narration of the story and edu-
cate covertly via the seductive power of (good) imitation. Whi le 
this type of poetry might be effective for P la to ' s purposes , it is 
very far indeed from what is commonly understood to be art. Al-
though modern art has done nothing if not challenge the " c o m m o n 
concept ion" of art, the heavy-handed artistic indoctrination that 
Plato reserves for.thepolis is not something that would be likely to 
draw large crowds. It may be possible to save art in P la to ' s Re-
public; however , this victory remains a pyrrhic one given the "ar t" 
that remains . 1 7 
The discussion of imitation within the Republic has led us to 
examine the relationship between art and phi losophy, and to an 
interesting—if somewhat unusual—comparison of P la to ' s good 
imitation and the theory-laden art of Danto ' s second and third mod-
els. This comparison is based on the relation of art to phi losophy: 
the more art comes to resemble philosophy, the more truly it imi-
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tates (for Plato) or the further along it is in its inevitable evolution 
(for Danto) . Thus Platonic good imitation would be a form of 
philosophy, insofar as the good imitator is creating copies of the 
form as directly as if he were acting in his other capacit ies as a 
guardian. The philosopher is the good imitator, and good imita-
tion is phi losophy—not for the betterment of the self, but for the 
betterment of others. 
Notes 
'Although the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany did not outlaw art, 
they did censor art and attempt to bend it to the purposes of the state. 
Describing and analyzing the uses to which art was put in both these 
regimes would necessitate a book. However, it can be argued that the 
perversions some art underwent in such societies may in a sense be worse 
than the mere exclusion or outlawing of art (although 'underground' art 
continued to flourish in even these barren settings). Plato himself may be 
guilty of these same crimes against art in the Republic, a topic to which 
we will return in the conclusion of this paper. 
2 The analysis in this essay is based on the translated works of Plato 
and, therefore, does not presume insight into philological subtleties of 
the text. Multiple translations of the Republic were consulted; however, 
for the sake of consistency, quotations are taken from the version found 
in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 575-844. 
1 There are many lies that Plato sanctions in developing his plan for 
the Republic. For example, he takes as a matter of fact that there will be 
false stories told to the children when they are young (377 ff., 415, etc.). 
Note, however, that the blind obedience to the strict morality developed 
by these false stories leads to a potential breakdown in some guardians 
when they are exposed in the course of their training to the art of dialectic 
(538e). In addition to educational lies, there is the more disturbing devel-
opment of lies to cover up the state mandated policy of eugenics and 
keep the infanticide hidden from all except the guardians who carry out 
this function (460c). Plato's inadequate excuse for these lies at 382cd 
does not alleviate the contradiction inherent in the search for truth (and 
justice) through a city steeped in governmental lies. Such passages as 
these—along with Plato's failure at Syracuse—tend to imply that the 
Republic may serve better as a guide for the ordering our souls that it 
does as a blueprint for political successes. 
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4For examples of imitation proper to the good man, see 396de. 
5Both J. Tate ("'Imitation' in Plato's Republic," in Classical Quar-
terly, vol. 22 [1928], 16-23.) and E. Belfiore ("A Theory of Imitation in 
Plato's Republic," in Transactions of the American Philological Asso-
ciation, 114 [1984], 121-146.) recognize that Plato's initial statement in 
Book X is referring, not to all types of imitation or imitation in general, 
but to the specific kind of imitation which had already been determined 
to be bad in Book III. The understanding of the distinction between "good 
imitation" and "bad imitation" in this paper is taken, in part, from a read-
ing of Tate and Belfiore. 
6 See Republic 505-518 passim. 
7 J. Tate, "Imitation in Plato's Republic," 19. 
"Ibid. Tate can make this inference because of Plato's description of 
the painter who uses the "divine paradigm" rather than the mirror image 
(500-501c). There is a difference between common statecraft and "genuine 
statecraft." Genuine statecraft rules the state with the forms in mind. In 
a similar manner there exists both mere imitative painting, and "genuine 
painting" which represents (i.e. imitates) with the forms in mind. 
9It is, however, possible to attack this foundation itself. Although 
Plato attempts to hold fast to the rule of one person, one expertise, this 
distinction begins to break down in Book X when discussing knowledge 
and the philosopher (see the discussion at 601c ff.). It is unclear if Plato 
really believes that the philosopher who has apprehended the forms knows 
the art of making horse tack better than the smith and the leatherworker. 
However, odds are that most equestrians would choose to trust the tack 
made by the man who does not know (the craftsman) that that made by 
the man who does know (the philosopher). 
1 0 Arthur Danto, "The End of Art," in The Death of Art, ed. Berel 
Lang (Haven Publications, Inc), 5-35. 
1 1 Arthur C. Danto, "The End of Art," 34. 
1 2 These proposals are founded on the assumption that the older guard-
ians will become too infirm for the duties of governing while they are 
still capable of verbally communicating the truth through poetry. This 
assumption itself is questionable in Plato's Republic. The guardians do 
not even begin their final phase of training for governing until they are 
fifty years old! Plato obviously wants the city to be run by the most 
experienced (thus, the oldest) capable guardians. However, against this 
difficulty lies the fact that Plato also believes that each successive gen-
eration of guardians will be more capable than the previous generation 
due to the practice of selective breeding and infanticide. Thus, the guard-
ians coming up through the ranks would be better versions of the men 
and women who they will be replacing, once their education is complete. 
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It is easy to conceive of a time when these younger guardians are experi-
enced and capable enough to be ready to take over the reigns of the Re-
public while the older generation has not yet died off. 
1 3 As long as we are making this unusual comparison between Plato 
and Danto, it is worth noting that the distinction between "good imita-
tion" and "bad imitation" is one of two entirely different kinds of artistic 
endeavors. Good imitation is art that could only be accounted to under 
what Danto calls the "Reality Theory" (RT) of art, while bad imitation 
would still be accounted for with the "Imitative Theory" (IT). These two 
kinds of art are distinguished by their goals. Art that can be understood 
with the IT is attempting to imitate the visually perceived world. How-
ever, some art cannot be accounted for with the IT and must be under-
stood in terms of the RT of art. Such art is not imitative, but creative. RT 
art creates in a way that is "if no more real than what carpenters wrought 
[it is] at least no less real" (Arthur Danto, "The Artworld," in Art and Its 
Significance, ed. Stephen David Ross (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 470-482). The distinction between art that can 
be accounted for with IT and art that can be accounted for with RT is 
exactly the distinction between good and bad imitation that we are trying 
to make. Bad imitation is merely imitating. Good imitation is actually 
creating (although this is still an imitation at one remove from the form 
within Plato's metaphysical framework). 
, 4 Arthur Danto, "The End of Art" 24. 
1 5 Ibid., 31. 
1 6 The Republic itself can be seen in these terms. The ideal art of 
Plato's state would contain lots of philosophy and narration along with a 
bit of entertainment in the form of good imitation. Although the Repub-
lic itself would no doubt fail its own test if "performed" with the imita-
tion of people like Thrasymachus, if performed well, it would no doubt 
be something akin to the type of poetic entertainment Plato envisions. 
The proper performance of the Republic would be something like a mono-
tone narrative with the exception of imitating Socrates. 
1 7 This is not to imply that modern artistic expression is without merit. 
Rather we are attempting to indicate that the art left in the Republic would 
be difficult for the commoners to understand and would thus not be ini-
tially or instinctively compelling to them. Witness the modern aversion 
to modern art among people who are unfamiliar with the theories behind 
the artworks. In a similar manner, the people of the Republic would have 
to be educated into an understanding of the art allowed in the polis. 
